Michigan Law Review
Volume 85
Issue 5 Issue 5&6
1987

Apocalypse Now?
Richard L. Marcus
University of Illinois College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Legal Remedies Commons, Litigation Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and
the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol85/iss5/41

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

APOCALYPSE NOW?
Richard L. Marcus*

TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS. By Peter H. Schuck. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press. 1986. Pp. ix, 347. $25.
AGENT ORANGE ON

Rambo [displaying photo of his Vietnam platoon]: And there's Delmar,
right in the back. We had to put him in the back because he is so big.
If we didn't, he'd take up the whole picture. Look how big he is.
Delmar's Mother: Delmar's gone.
Rambo: What time will he be back?
Mother: He died.
Rambo: What?
Mother: Died last summer.
Rambo: Died? How?
Mother: Cancer. Brought it back from 'Nam. All that orange stuff,
they spread it all around. Cut him down to nothing. I could lift him
off the sheet.
First Blood 1
[C]ertain products have achieved such national notoriety due to their
tremendous impact on the consuming public, that the mere mention of
their names - Agent Orange, Asbestos, DES, MER/29, Dalkon Shield
- conjure images of massive litigation, corporate stonewalling, and infrequent yet prevalent, "big money" punitive damage awards.
- Judge Spencer Williams2
For more than two decades, the Vietnam war has hung over the
American social and political system. From time to time fallout from
the war has intruded into the American judicial system as well. Some
tried to use the judiciary to interdict military operations in Southeast
Asia, but the courts refused to become involved. 3 Similarly unsuccess-

* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1969, Pomona College; J.D. 1972, University of California, Berkeley. - Ed. I am indebted to Linda Schoemaker and Nancy Van Winkle
for research assistance.
1. Anabasis Investments, N.V. 1981. This is the opening scene in the movie. After leaving
Delmar's mother, in a state of turmoil about the news of Delmar's death, Rambo encounters the
unfriendly sheriff and drifts into his own apocalypse.
2. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" l.U.D. Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887,
892 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins
Co. v. ABED, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
3. E.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (denying Massachusetts leave to file bill
of complaint in Supreme Court to challenge constitutionality of Vietnam War); McArthur v.
Clifford, 402 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.) (rejecting petitions for habeas corpus relief filed by reservists
ordered to Vietnam who asserted their orders were illegal because there had been no declaration
of war), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968); Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (seek1267
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fu1 were governmental attempts to have the courts suppress the Pentagon Papers.4 More recently, General William Westmoreland has gone
to court to challenge a CBS story that charged him with misleading
American political leadership about the actual progress of the war. 5
Significant though this litigation was, it has been eclipsed in dimension by personal injury lawsuits brought by veterans exposed to the
herbicide Agent Orange. These cases began slowly in the late 1970s,
but by the time the resulting class action approached trial they had
mushroomed into a litigation colossus. There never was an in-court
confrontation between the veterans and the chemical companies, however. Instead on May 7, 1984, the ninth anniversary of the withdrawal
of the U.S. troops from Vietnam, the class action was settled for $180
million, the largest personal injury settlement in American litigation
history. The settlement prompted immediate and substantial attention
in the print media, 6 and the Agent Orange problem has since been
featured in a made-for-TV movie. 7 But it was never legally established
that Agent Orange has actually harmed anyone, since the same ailments were found in people not exposed to the herbicide. Indeed, the
claims of veterans who opted out of the class action were ultimately
rejected for lack of proof of causation.
Obviously the story of the Agent Orange litigation deserved to be
told, and Professor Schuck's book does an excellent job of recounting
the many twists and turns it took from its modest beginnings to its
celebrated conclusion. Unlike the tendentious recent books on the asing declaratory judgment that military activity in Vietnam was "illegal"), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
934 (1967). The court did grant certiorari in other cases involving fallout from the war. See, e.g.,
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (association of Reserve
members lacks standing to challenge membership in Armed Forces Reserve of members of Con·
gress); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (prosecution for burning draft card as part
of antiwar protest not forbidden by first amendment).
4. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
5. For a description ofthls litigation, see R. ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD (1986); see also
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (officer who reported atrocities by American troops in
Vietnam brought defamation suit against CBS for questioning the accuracy of his reports).
6. The New York Times ran a prominent front page story on the settlement, backed up with a
spread of subsidiary stories on inside pages. See Blumenthal, Veterans Accept $180 Million Pact
on Agent Orange, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1984, at l, col. 5. The Times later expressed editorial
doubt over the propriety of such a large settlement absent proof Agent Orange harmed the class.
See Orangemail: Why It Got Paid, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1985, at A34, col. 1. Both Time and
Newsweek ran full page stories on the settlement. See Lamar, Winning Peace with Honor, TIME,
May 21, 1984, at 39; Press, A Fast Deal on Agent Orange, NEWSWEEK, May 21, 1984, at 56.
7. Unnatural Causes (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1986) (starring John Ritter and
Alfre Woodard). The New York Times explained that the film "presents the case for the Vietnam
veterans who are demanding redress for their exposure to the herbicide Agent Orange. • • . This
is drama with a point of view, and the producers make the most of the opportunity, leaving no
doubt as to who their heroes and villains are." O'Conner, NBC Film on Agent Orange Dispute,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at C23, col. 4. For another example of general media attention to
the effects of Agent Orange, see Distelheim, There's a Time Bomb Ticking Inside Me, FAMILY
CIRCLE, Oct. 15, 1985, at 46, detailing health problems that a former flight attendant who flew in
Vietnam attributes to Agent Orange.
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bestos and Dalkon Shield litigation, 8 Professor Schuck's study is not
designed to expose corporate evil in America. It is instead a thoughtful evaluation of the way in which the Agent Orange problem was
processed by the courts, written with explanations of legal doctrine
that should provide laymen with an unparalleled inside glimpse of the
details of contemporary complex litigation.
For the professional reader, Professor Schuck treats the case as a
"harbinger of mass toxic tort cases yet to come" (p. 13) and therefore
seeks to use the Agent Orange story as a springboard for apocalyptic
visions of litigation as a social response to the problem of exposure to
toxics. While laudable, this effort seems somewhat misdirected.
Schuck draws generally on the massive literature criticizing the tort
system as a whole, but this case is extraordinary in ways that make it a
poor vehicle for such criticisms. Indeed, as the flawed studies of the
asbestos and Dalkon Shield litigations make clear, the tort system
seems a necessary tool even in mass exposure cases.
Despite Professor Schuck's inclinations, it seems to this reader that
his story raises more significant questions about procedural matters.
Although some commentators express enthusiasm for class action in
mass tort cases,9 the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs' counsel in
the Agent Orange litigation provide reason for caution in use of the
device. Much more significantly, the book provides a detailed expose
8. On asbestos, see P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE AsBESTOS INDUSTRY
ON TRIAL (1985). As Professor Schuck rightly observes, this book is "tendentious." P. 303 n.7.
On the Dalkon Shield, see S. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE: ONE JUDGE'S
BATILE TO EXPOSE THE DEADLY DALKON SHIELD I.U.D. (1985). This book has been properly
denounced for its uncritical acceptance of highly questionable crusading by Judge Miles Lord to
expose wrongdoing by the A.H. Robins Co. See Book Note, 99 HARV. L. REv. 875 (1986).
9. For example, in 1984 Professor Charles Alan Wright argued as follows in support of class
certification in In re School Asbestos Litig., 594 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1984):
I was an ex officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when Rule 23 was
amended, which came out with an Advisory Committee Note saying that mass torts are
inappropriate for class certification. I thought then that was true. I am profoundly convinced now that that is untrue. Unless we can use the class action and devices built on the
class action, our judicial system is simply not going to be able to cope with the challenge of
the mass repetitive wrong •...
Transcript of Oral Argument, July 30, 1984, at 106, In re School Asbestos Litig., 594 F. Supp.
178 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (No. 83-0268), quoted in H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 17.06, at 373 (2d ed. 1985). Despite arguments for aflirmance by Professor Arthur Miller, as
counsel for the class, the Third Circuit reversed certification of a mandatory class action for
punitive damages in that case while affirming certification of a (b)(3) opt-out class. See In re
School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. School
Dist. of Lancaster, 107 S. Ct. 182 (1986).
Concluding that Rule 23 as presently written will not suffice for such cases, Professor Mullenix has recently proposed federal legislation to require class action treatment for "truly nationwide mass-injury cases." Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 TEXAS L. REv. 1039, 1046 (1986). Her solution to the adequacy of representation problem is to direct that only state attorneys general be allowed to prosecute such cases. See
id. at 1083-86. Given the desire of the veterans to control their own lawyers in the Agent Orange
litigation, however, it may be that this alternative will not sit well with such plaintiff class members. On the other hand, many veterans ultimately concluded their lawyers were not responsive
to their desires in Agent Orange.
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of one episode in another movement that has recently generated massive literature - vigorous judicial promotion of settlement. We discover that the $180 million settlement was crafted by Judge Jack
Weinstein, who privately selected this figure as the "right" amount
and then employed an array of extremely effective prods to persuade
the lawyers on both sides to accept it. If there is an apocalyptic vision
to be drawn from the Agent Orange litigation, it is that less talented
judges may regularly use such prods to coerce acceptance of the results they conclude are more just than formal adjudication would
probably yield. Although Professor Schuck identifies this problem, he
provides little insight into resolution of the fundamental tension between this sort of judicial activity and the traditional role of judges in
deciding cases according to their legal merits.

I. THE STORYlO
Ironically, Agent Orange 11 was supposed to be the model herbicide, a synthetic substitute for existing weed killers that were thought
to be more dangerous. Between 1965 and 1971, some ten million gallons of Agent Orange were sprayed over as much as ten percent of
South Vietnam's land area because it was especially effective in defoliating the woody and broad-leaved vegetation that grew so profusely
there, sheltering Viet Cong activities. Unfortunately, a by-product of
the manufacture of Agent Orange was contamination with a dioxin
called TCDD, which has been described as "perhaps the most toxic
molecule ever synthesized by man" (p. 18). The concentration of this
dioxin in the products of different manufacturers varied dramatically,
and Agent Orange produced by different manufacturers was often
mixed rather indiscriminately in Vietnam before it was used. As a
result, the herbicide actually sprayed there had TCDD concentrations
ranging from one part per million to 140 parts per million. Overall,
some 240 pounds of TCDD were probably deposited there. American
soldiers in Vietnam undoubtedly came in contact with it as a result,
but there is no way now to know the frequency of such exposure or the
concentration of the Agent Orange involved.
10. Professor Schuck concentrates almost entirely on the internal activities of the plaintiffs'
side and the settlement promotion by Judge Weinstein. Notably absent is any substantial insight
into defendants' views of the case. In part, this slant may reflect greater willingness on the
plaintiffs' side to talk to the professor, but he did interview at least some defense counsel. See pp.
301-02. This focus on the plaintiffs' handling of the litigation is markedly different from the
recent books on asbestos and Dalkon Shield litigation, and a welcome shift from their
tendentiousness, see note 8 supra. But the limited attention given to defendants' development of
the herbicide and handling of the litigation leaves the reader with little basis for assessing the
charge of "Orangemail." See note 6 supra.
11. Agent Orange got its name from the orange stripe on container drums manufacturers
used to distinguish this mixture from other synthetic herbicides of similar chemical configuration
identified by other colors - blue, white, purple, green, and pink. P. 16. The lurid ring of the
name was fortuitous; one suspects that Agent White would pack a lot less wallop in the media.
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When they came home, the Vietnam veterans confronted unprecedented public indifference, and sometimes hostility. Over time, many
also began to fall ill, 12 although they didn't initially connect these disorders to Agent Orange. But Maude deVictor, a benefits counselor at
the Chicago regional office of the Veterans Administration, thought
she discerned a pattern. The statistics she gathered eventually were
aired as a special report by a Chicago television station in 1978. This
program prompted new Vietnam veterans' organizations13 to focus on
Agent Orange, which one organizer saw as a "metaphor for the Vietnam veterans' helplessness" (p. 41). These organizations also started
looking for lawyers to represent veterans exposed to Agent Orange.
The saga of the Agent Orange litigation began with a 1978 telephone call to a Long Island lawyer by Paul Reutershan, who had
flown through clouds of Agent Orange serving in a helicopter crew in
Vietnam. Although he was something of a health nut, neither drinking nor smoking, Reutershan was dying from virulent stomach cancer.
He wanted to sue the chemical companies who made Agent Orange
because he believed it had caused his disease. Reutershan died in late
1978, but he left a legacy: his lawsuit eventually became the Agent
Orange class action.
Pursuing a nationwide class action was the idea of Victor Yannacone, a Long Island lawyer whom activist veterans persuaded to get
involved in the case. Yannacone emerges as one of the two striking
figures in Professor Schuck's book (the other being Judge Weinstein).
Described by some as "more than a lawyer ... a passionate partisan, a
crusader" (p. 43), he was viewed more skeptically by his colleagues,
one of whom characterized him as "a legend in his own mind" (p.
103). He claimed, for example, to have invented the term "environmental law" and to have launched the campaign to ban DDT. After
he retooled Reutershan's suit as a nationwide class action against all
12. Whether Vietnam veterans fell ill unusually frequently is unclear. A recent study by the
Centers for Disease Control indicates that although Vietnam veterans experienced significantly
higher mortality than non-Vietnam veterans these heightened levels of death do not relate to
disease. The Centers compared mortality among approximately 9,000 Vietnam veterans and
9,000 non-Vietnam veterans and found that overall mortality was 17% higher among Vietnam
veterans. See Centers for Disease Control, Postservice Mortality Among Vietnam Veterans, J.
A.M.A., Feb. 13, 1987, at 790, 791. But the areas in which the Vietnam veterans showed higher
rates of mortality were motor vehicle accidents and accidental poisoning deaths (mostly by
drugs). Id. at 792. In terms of death by disease, the most significant difference is that the nonVietnam veterans experienced much higher rates of death due to diseases of the circulatory system. Id. tab. 4, at 793. The researchers characterized this finding as "surprising." Id. at 795.
More recently, the Centers for Disease Control abandoned a Congressionally mandated study of
the effects of Agent Orange on American ground soldiers in Vietnam because too few soldiers
were found who were exposed to significant levels of the herbicide. Boffey, U.S. Halting Study on
Agent Orange, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (natl. ed.).
13. The established veterans' organizations, the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign
Wars, were often unsympathetic to the problems of Vietnam veterans, so the returning Vietnam
veterans tended to establish their own groups. P. 25. For these fledgling organizations, the
Agent Orange issue was a made-to-order organizing tool.
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manufacturers of Agent Orange and filed it in federal court in early
1979, he began barnstorming across the country trying to excite interest in the suit among veterans. Throughout the years of litigation that
followed, Y annacone continued to personify the suit for many veterans, and to identify with their yearning for something more than judicial relief. As he told the groups of veterans, "We can't win, but I'll at
least get you your day in court" (p. 47).
Yannacone also wanted to retain personal control of the litigation
and he therefore joined with defendant Dow Chemical Company's
lawyer in asking the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to send
all Agent Orange cases to the Eastern District of New York, where his
class action was pending (p. 49). His strategy was soon threatened by
a pair of Texas lawyers who had filed over 100 individual suits and
had no interest in subservient roles in Y annacone's suit. Partly in response to this challenge, in the fall of 1979, Yannacone recruited a
group of Long Island personal injury lawyers and made a "super salesman . . . pitch to their imaginations, patriotism, idealism, and profit
motives" (p. 51) to join him. Thus was born Yannacone & Associates,
a loosely-organized consortium of small firms pledging $2,000 each to
the case as well as committing substantial time. For nearly four years,
this grab-bag legal team headed up the largest tort case in history even
though many of its members rapidly concluded they could not work
with their generalissimo, Y annacone.
Meanwhile, the case had been assigned to U.S. District Judge
George Pratt, who methodically addressed a variety of legal issues
raised by pre-trial maneuvering. The chemical companies filed thirdparty complaints for indemnity against the United States and raised
the "governmental contractor'' defense, asserting that they were immune from liability because they were only following the government's
orders. Judge Pratt eventually held that the government was immune
from suit under Feres v. United States, 14 set forth ground rules for the
governmental contractor defense, ruled that a class action would be
certified, and in December 1980 scheduled the governmental contractor defense for separate trial in mid-1983. 15 As the trial approached,
however, Judge Pratt realized that the problem of causation was central to all other matters and decided that all issues in the case would be
tried together.16
The prospect of preparing the whole case for trial was more than
the financially strapped members of Y annacone & Associates could
tolerate. The rancor between Yannacone and his colleagues already
14. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
15. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). [Hereinafter citations lacking case names refer to In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.]
16. 565 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Professor Schuck comments that "the wonder is
that it had taken so long" to recognize the problem. P. 101.
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"had erupted into all-out warfare" (p. 105), and in September 1983 a
reconstituted Plaintiffs' Management Committee (PMC) was substituted as counsel for the class. 17 Yannacone was quickly thrust to the
periphery of the litigation, although he remained the champion of
many veterans and regularly appeared at hearings with a phalanx of
fatigue-clad veterans to serve as a self-described golem to Judge
Weinstein.
When Judge Pratt was elevated to the Second Circuit, the Agent
Orange case was reassigned to Judge Weinstein, who summoned all
the lawyers to his chambers for a get-together in October 1983. In the
course of the afternoon, he "turned the Agent Orange case around,
inside out, and on its head" (p. 112). Most dramatically, he set the
entire case for trial on May 7, 1984, barely six months away. He also
indicated that he would backtrack on Judge Pratt's dismissal of claims
against the United States three years before. Beyond that, he observed
that the central problem in the case was causation, allowing that liability was "highly doubtful" (p. 113). Finally, he suggested that the best
outcome would be a settlement, a goal Professor Schuck tells us was
uppermost in the judge's mind from the outset (p. 143).
The early trial date galvanized the lawyers into a frenzy of trial
preparation. On the PMC in particular, there was "a mood of near
panic" that led to new recruitment efforts to raise money for the case
(p. 120). Eventually six prominent lawyers were persuaded to "invest" a total of $1,450,000 in the case in return for seats on the PMC
and a promise that, if there were a fee award, they would be repaid
threefold "off the top" even though they were to take no substantial
responsibility for the actual preparation or presentation of the case. 18
17. 571 F. Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Judge Pratt noted that "[c]ontinuation of the present
pattern of representation of the plaintiffs through a group of attorneys, rather than by a single
lead counsel, is in the best interests of the plaintiffs." 571 F. Supp. at 483. The extent of Judge
Pratt's appreciation of the disarray within Yannacone & Associates is a source of enduring uneasiness about the case. See Part III.A infra.
18. Pp. 120-21. When this arrangement became public, Yannacone characterized it as "300
percent interest ... [charged by] your friendly neighborhood loan shark." Moore, Fee-Splitting
Agreement Draws Attention ofAgent Orange Judge, Legal Times, Nov. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 2, 7, col.
2. Under pressure from the judge, plaintiffs' counsel renegotiated the agreement somewhat. The
judge later rejected a challenge by one lawyer on the PMC who was awarded $1.3 million for his
time on the case but would have to shift $1 million of his fee to the investors. See 611 F. Supp.
1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
This unorthodox financing scheme is defended in Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The
Plaintiff As Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5,
57-65. In part, he reasons as follows:
In Agent Orange, the plaintiffs' team was insolvent, and it had to attract new capital to bring
the action to trial. Although those members on the management committee who could not
advance further funds stood to lose compensation for their considerable time already expended in the action, this time was a sunk cost that would be disregarded by a rational
decisionmaker. To put it simply, had additional funds not been secured, this time would
probably have had little value because the action would have had to be abandoned or settled
very cheaply. While a 300% return may seem excessive in absolute terms, there is no apparent reason to distrust the bargaining among the attorneys that produced this result; those
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Despite the infusion of capital, the PMC remained so disorganized
that the judge directed that discovery continue through the trial. As
the "exhausted" PMC lawyers "staggered" toward trial, one activist
veteran, appalled by their lack of preparation, launched a nationwide
campaign to get veterans to write the judge asking him to postpone the
trial (p. 142).
Pursuing his interest in settlement, Judge Weinstein appointed special settlement masters in late April, and they began lobbying for a
compromise. All the lawyers were directed to report to the courthouse over the weekend before trial was to begin for around-the-clock
settlement negotiations. When they arrived, the sides were kept separate and the masters, sometimes accompanied by the judge, pressured
both sides to moderate their positions. For example, the judge told the
defendants' lawyers he intended to adopt the plaintiffs' theory that any
manufacturer that knew its product would be mixed with herbicides
manufactured by others was liable for injuries caused by the mixture.
Under this theory, all the defendants would be liable if causation could
be proved (pp. 154-55). Yet when speaking to the PMC lawyers, the
judge said, according to one lawyer:
I have carried you plaintiffs all this time. I have decided a lot of questions in your favor that I could have decided the other way. And I want
you to know that at nine o'clock Monday morning I am through carrying you. . . . [R]emember, I just don't think you have got a case on
medical causation. [pp. 160-61]

Buffeted by these pitches, genuinely alarmed by the implications of
what the judge and masters had told them, and worn down by the
ordeal of preparing for trial, the lawyers all agreed, at three in the
morning on the day the trial was to begin, to settle for $180 million.
who agreed to subordinate or shift their claims to the newly arrived attorneys had every
reason to bargain at arm's length and no reason to pay an excessive return.
Id. at 6().61. More generally, it may be that investment in law firms may be the wave of the
future. See Kaplan, Want to Invest in a Law Firm?, Natl. L.J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 4 (reporting proposed ethical rules in North Dakota and the District of Columbia that would allow lay
investment in law firms despite risks that lawyers may become subservient to non-lawyers).
Professor Coffee's analysis may make perfect sense as a matter of economics. Indeed, it has
been suggested in the derivative action context that the most effective enforcement device would
be to give the attorney· the entire recovery. See Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law
Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv. 927, 941 n.43 (1983) (noting that this is
"a thought too horrible to contemplate for at least another decade"). But these concepts do not
fit into traditional class action analysis. To the contrary, the courts have carefully separated the
interests of class counsel and class representative. Thus, in Cotchett v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 56
F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court held that the class representative could not be a law
partner of the class counsel because that would create a conflict of interest for the representative,
who would benefit financially from increased attorney's fees. One court has even refused to
certify a class because class counsel promised the class representative that he would not sue the
representative to recover the costs of the action if it were unsuccessful. See In re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. 485 (D. Md. 1982). Whatever objections one might make to
these decisions, they show that economic analysis and class action analysis are not precisely
congruent; even if the economists would be satisfied with a "headless class action," the class
action rules as presently interpreted forbid it. For the Second Circuit's reaction to the arrange·
ment in Agent Orange, see note 27 infra.
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The last-minute settlement did not end the litigation. Almost immediately, it was roundly attacked by many veterans (possibly egged
on by Yannacone). Some argued that $180 nzjllion was far too small a
sum, an objection that was reinforced by a Newsweek report that
defendants "privately chortled that they had walked away after paying
only '10 cents on the dollar.' " 19 More fundamentally, many claimed
that the settlement had frustrated their prime goal for the suit - having their day in court - a point reinforced by the fact that the chemical companies had denied any wrongdoing in the settlement. Through
five fairness hearings across the country, Judge Weinstein patiently listened as objectors made these points repeatedly, but he approved the
settlement anyway. 20 Turning to the question of fees for plaintiffs'
counsel, which he could set because they were to be paid out of the
settlement pot, the judge allowed a very low amount, barely five percent of the settlement figure. 21 He explained that although he believed
that counsel had "done as much with this case as anyone could" (p.
195), the result was not due to this work. Instead, "[i]t was due to the
basic problem that the defendants had in trying to get rid of a case.
Had you been permitted to go forward with all your work, in my opinion, you would have gotten nothing from the case" (p. 194). After
protracted consideration of how to pay out the money, he adopted a
distribution plan that minimized costs associated with proving entitlement to payment even though that would tend to give money to those
who may have suffered no harm. 22 Meanwhile, in suits brought by
veterans who opted out of the class action, the judge granted defendants summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs had no credible
proof of causation even though they had experts who were willing to
testify that their maladies were due to exposure to Agent Orange. 23
19. Press, supra note 6, at 56.
20. 618 F. Supp. 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
21. 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
22. 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). As Professor Schuck points out, a strong argument
could be made for applying traditional tort principles to distinguish between class members actually harmed by Agent Orange and those not so harmed, but the concomitant administrative
difficulties make this possibility unworkable. See pp. 206-23.
23. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The judge's
reasoning was that, since epidemiological studies had showed no higher incidence of the maladies
suffered by plaintiff in the exposed population than in the general population, the experts' conclusions were too speculative to support recovery. Professor Schuck calls this the "single most farreaching ruling" in the case. P. 234.
For criticism of Judge Weinstein's summary judgment decision, see Nesson, Agent Orange
Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REv. 521 (1986).
Professor Nesson argues that the judge adopted "an erroneous and hard-edged statistical concept
of probability, which obscures the difference between law and science," id. at 526, and concludes
that the expert opinions should have sufficed to get to the jury. He recognizes, however, the
impact of that conclusion:
Imagine what would have happened had [opt-out plaintiff] Lilley won. In that event Judge
Weinstein would have determined that a rational jury could have concluded under the civil
standard of proof that Lilley's exposure to Agent Orange caused his injuries. But if a jury
could rationally reach that conclusion for Lilley, must it not also follow that a jury could

Michigan Law Review

1276

[Vol. 85:1267

Finally, having tied up all the loose ends in the litigation, Judge Weinstein turned to a courtroom full of lawyers, veterans, and onlookers
before entering his chambers and said, "Goodbye everybody. If I
don't see you again, I want you to know I have affection for all of
you." With a "genial wave," he was gone (p. 252).
Of course there were appeals from the judge's rulings. In April
1987, a panel of the Second Circuit issued a series of opinions deciding
these appeals. Principally authored by Judge Ralph Winter, Professor
Schuck's former colleague at the Yale Law School, and laced with
references to Professor Schuck's book,24 these opinions affirmed almost all of Judge Weinstein's rulings. In particular, they affirmed his
certification of a class action and approval of the $180 million settlement25 and the grant of summary judgment against the claims of the
opt-out plaintiffs. 26 The appellate court did, however, invalidate the
fee-sharing agreement that rewarded the investors. 27 Perhaps this finally closes the Agent Orange chapter in American litigation
history. 28

11.

APOCALYPSE IN THE TORT SYSTEM?

Telling the story is not enough. As Professor Schuck recognizes,
rationally conclude that dioxin caused cancer among the population of soldiers exposed in
Vietnam? Were Judge Weinstein to allow a medical diagnostician's opinion to satisfy Lil·
ley's burden of proving causation, he could not refuse to allow a similar expert opinion to
satisfy the burden of proof for the class, regardless of what epidemiology had to say.
Id. at 536.
24. See 818 F.2d 145, 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1987); 818 F.2d 179, 182 (2d Cir. 1987); 818 F.2d
187, 193 (2d Cir. 1987).
25. 818 F.2d 145· (2d Cir. 1987). The court noted that "it was essentially a settlement at
nuisance value." 818 F.2d at 171.
26. 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). The focus of the plaintiffs on appeal was the judge's refusal
to credit their expert testimony on causation, but the appellate court placed principal reliance on
the military contractor defense, which plaintiffs' counsel did not even brief. See 818 F.2d at 190
& n.5. For an illustration of the continuing vitality of the Feres doctrine, see, e.g., United States
v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).
27. 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987). The court reasoned that shifting fees from the lawyers who
should have received fees based on their work to the lawyers who had invested in the lawsuit
"completely distorted the lodestar approach to fee awards." 818 F.2d at 222. The court also
rejected the idea that the PMC somehow constituted an ad hoc partnership (see note 18 supra):
"They merely are a group of individual lawyers and law firms associated in the prosecution of a
single lawsuit, and they lack the ongoing relationship that is the essential element of attorneys
practicing as partners." 818 F.2d at 226. The court did not, however, entirely forbid fee-sharing
agreements under different circumstances, and another panel of the Second Circuit has recently
upheld and enforced such an agreement under significantly different circumstances. See Stissi v.
Interstate & Ocean Transp., 814 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1987).
28. The other rulings of the court of appeals included decisions approving Judge Weinstein's
plan for distribution of the proceeds of the settlement (except for his plan to use some of the
money to create a foundation), 818 F.2d 179, affirmance of dismissal of all claims against the
United States by veterans and their wives or by the Agent Orange manufacturers for indemnity,
818 F.2d 194; 818 F.2d 201; 818 F.2d 204, and affirmance of Judge Weinstein's fee awards, 818
F.2d 226; see also 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (decision of a different court of appeals panel
upholding unsealing of discovery materials).
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"any serious effort to evaluate the Agent Orange case cannot be satisfied by a merely descriptive account; it must also confront the normative question of what that system (at least as applied to mass toxic
exposures) ought to be" (p. 257; emphasis in original). His goal is that
the reader will be "buoyed by the encouraging array of reform options" presented in his concluding chapters (p. viii).
The basic problem with the analysis that follows is that Professor
Schuck draws largely upon contemporary criticisms of more ordinary
tort cases for his explorations of alternatives. The tort system has certainly come in for a lot of bashing lately. Some of this may be attributed to self-interested lobbying by insurance and related interests, but
there are real objections to the system. It doles out compensation in
inconsistent amounts, leaving many without remedy because they have
been struck down by natural forces or a penniless actor or because
they can't identify the person who harmed them. On the other hand,
leaving matters to lay jurors can impose enormous risks and uncertainty on providers of goods and services. Moreover, tort litigation
can be very expensive for all and can leave the injured party uncompensated to the extent that his lawyer takes a share, unless one views
"pain and suffering" awards as a device to cover plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees. 29 Evaluating these objections, which form the focus of numerous
lengthy symposia, 30 is obviously beyond the scope of a book review.
Nonetheless, Professor Schuck has performed a service by making this
debate accessible to lay readers.
Particularly because of the charged atmosphere in which the current discussion occurs, however, it is critical to appreciate that the
Agent Orange saga is not a parable about these deficiencies in the tort
system. Instead, this litigation presented the extraordinary difficulties
of both the indeterminate plaintiff and the indeterminate defendant,
which only the most ambitious courts have taken on. 31 To these it
added several complicating matters. First was the question of whether
Agent Orange actually causes harm; Professor Schuck contrasts it
with the "incontrovertible toxicity" of asbestos (p. 33). Beyond this
was the fact that the concentration of TCDD varied enormously
29. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 8.1, at 550 (1973) ("pain and
suffering damages •.. are simply a means of financing the contingent-fee litigation").
30. See, e.g.. Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 548
(1985); Critical Issues in Ton Law Reform: A Search for Principles, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 459
(1985).
31. Probably the most radical idea thus far has been the market share liability concept in
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cerL denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980). This decision drew heavily on Judge Weinstein's reasoning in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), where he upheld suits against all of the
manufacturers in the blasting cap industry although the persons injured by blasting caps could
not identify particular manufacturers as required by enterprise liability theory. According to
Professor Schuck, none of the parties briefed this theory in Hall; Judge Weinstein worked it up
himself. P. 112.

1278

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:1267

among manufacturers, and that the different products were mixed together in Vietnam. Finally, there was no way to determine accurately
how often an individual veteran had been exposed, or to identify the
mixture encountered. Given these forbidding obstacles to recovery, it
is not 'surprising that Professor Schuck tells us that "[a] case like Bhopal ... will probably be like child's play compared to Agent Orange"
(p. 14). Because of these special difficulties, he acknowledges that "it
would be foolish to redesign the entire tort system solely to deal with
them" (p. 261). Unfortunately, this message tends to get lost as the
discussion shifts to evaluating alternatives.
Because of the book's more general discussion of the continued
viability of tort litigation, it is also important to offer some cautionary
observations about the options that Schuck hopes will fill the reader
with confidence about the promise of reform.
A. Regulation
Drawing heavily on Peter Huber, 32 Professor Schuck suggests that
a better way of handling toxics would be through regulation by technocrats. Huber forcefully argues that the tort system inherently discriminates against new technologies, stressing their risks without
giving adequate weight to the reduction of risk that results when they
displace more dangerous technologies. Further, the ex post setting of
litigation is by definition inferior to an ex ante evaluation of risks versus benefits by technocrats who can make their decision before the
new technology is deployed.
The regulatory alternative seems a doubtful solution, at least in the
toxic torts area. In the abstract, of course, regulation appears to be a
wonderful thing. Surely none would prefer expensive efforts to compensate victims after the fact where the harm itself could have been
prevented by incisive regulatory intervention before the fact. Moreover, as Huber argues, technocrats may be better trained to balance
risks against benefits than judges and juries. But as Professor Schuck
recognizes, this enthusiasm must be viewed with skepticism: even
technocrats may lack the appropriate expertise for this sort of
calculus. Regarding Agent Orange, for example, how exactly does one
balance the benefits of the defoliant against the risks of fighting a guerrilla war without it? One of the most active veterans, a ground soldier
in Vietnam, felt during the war that Agent Orange was "great stuff.
We were fighting in a triple-canopy jungle . . . and I wanted those
planes to melt the whole thing away so we could see the enemy" (p.
32. See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, BS CoLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). It is worth noting that Judge Weinstein seems to share
some of Huber's concerns; he has criticized "the threat [from litigation] of post hoc risk assessments that do not advance society's overall needs [which in tum] inhibits socially useful action.
Inhibiting production of useful vaccines is one example .•••" Weinstein, The Role of the Court
in Toxic Tort Litigation, 13 GEO. L.J. 1389 (1985).
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41). The enemy were, indeed, trying to kill American soldiers on the
spot. Such imponderables provide a strong basis for the Feres doctrine. 33 Moreover, it is hard to understand how an expert acting in
1965 could have discerned the health risks, if any, that would result,
when causation was the main ambiguity in the litigation. In spite of
this, once the educated technocratic guess is made, the injured should
be left without compensation because "regulatory standards concerning the appropriate, socially acceptable level of risk should ordinarily
be binding on juries in subsequent tort cases. " 34
More fundamentally, however, regulation raises serious risks of
underenforcement and overenforcement due to political and related
pressures. Aggressive plaintiffs' lawyers pursue things that complacent bureaucrats do not. This can be strikingly illustrated, as David
Rosenberg has pointed out, with the story of the government inspector
at an asbestos plant who bravely eschewed a protective mask and exposed himself to the dust (which he knew to be harmful) in order to
assist the manufacturers in concealing the hazards of asbestos from the
workers. 35 Only the foolish would ignore the risk that a regulatory
body will become a kept creature of industry. 36 At the same time,
there is equal reason to worry about a regulatory body composed of
zealots. The manifold frustrations experienced by those who seek to
33. As the Second Circuit put it in affirming the summary judgment Judge Weinstein granted
against the opt-outs, Agent Orange's "success as a herbicide saved many, perhaps thousands of,
lives." 818 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1987).
34. P. 291. Cf City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (court may not enjoin
activity causing pollution where defendant held permit from Environmental Protection Agency).
With Agent Orange, of course, the question whether the chemical companies made a full disclosure to the government (raised by the government contractor defense) is the kind of issue that
might undermine reliance on regulatory permission. Surely the regulated should not be allowed
simultaneously to deceive the regulators and to invoke the protection of a permit issued by the
uninformed agency. But to allow litigation of this issue would seem to frustrate the desire to take
such matters out of the courts. Cf Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (denial of
immunity from suit immediately appealable because "it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial"); Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More
Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829, 901 (1983) ("If a defendant must defend on the merits
whenever a plaintiff invokes tolling [under the fraudulent concealment doctrine], the protection
of the statute of limitations will be substantially undermined.").
35. See Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story ofAsbestos - Carnage, Cover-up, and
Litigation (Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1706 (1986) (citing P. BRODEUR, supra note
8, at 89). The inspectors also entered into a confidentiality agreement that forbade disclosure of
the hazards of asbestos to workers. P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 89. Some inspectors themselves remained in the dark. See id. at 79 ("[A]s the health situation at the Tyler plant went from
bad to worse to appalling, a parade of government inspectors continued to troop through the
place without any apparent awareness of the manifest hazards there.").
36. As just one recent instance of such charges, consider the controversy about Nuclear Regulatory Commission member Thomas Roberts, a former manufacturer of nuclear reactor components, who has been linked to the leaking of internal investigatory documents to a utility and
charged with improperly favoring the nuclear power industry. See, e.g., Franklin, Nuclear Official Pressed to Resign, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1987, at A25, col. 1; Franklin, Nuclear Officials
Assailed As Biased, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 5. Perhaps the fact there has been
controversy shows things can work, but the charges are nevertheless troubling.
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engage in real property development in areas where there is great enthusiasm for regulating land development should cause the proponents
of regulation to pause. 37 Indeed, Huber himself has recently catalogued the failings of regulation of electrical power. 38 Assuming that
tort litigation overly deters new technologies, is it clear that zealous
technocrats won't inhibit them more by nipping them in the bud?
Their ex ante judgments are, after all, just that, and they may be
wrong. Surely they will be more likely to deny permission to try new
technologies if the fact that they give permission circumscribes the
rights of the injured. On top of all this is the prospect, graphically
illustrated by the contrasting attitudes toward regulation of the Carter
and Reagan administrations, that shifts in political winds may end up
inflicting both bad types of regulation alternatively.
On balance, then, the prospect of substituting regulation for litigation is not comforting despite the drawbacks of the tort system. 39
Even Professor Schuck acknowledges that "[u]ntil we have greater
37. Professor Schuck himself has recently documented the deleterious effects of overregulation in an article about the "informal economy" that exists in Peru. He explains that this economic activity (roughly half the economic activity in the country) has come into existence
without official permits because those are too hard to obtain due to "regulatory overkill" and
"bureaucratic lethargy and red tape." Schuck & Litan, Regulatory Reform in the Third World:
The Case of Peru, 4 YALE J. ON REG. SI, 61 (1986).
38. Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 1002 (1987).
39. Yet another difficulty is the risk of jurisdictional uncertainty. At present, regulation generally is limited to a given area. Presumably there will never be a single set of technocrats with
the expertise (and time) to pass on all new technology, so it will continue to be necessary to split
up jurisdiction. See Huber, supra note 38, at 1013 (''The heart of the problem is the division of
authority among several separate agencies, each of which is almost wholly oblivious to the technological alternatives that lie outside its own particular area of expertise."). This may permit
producers to escape regulation, or at least shift to more sympathetic regulators, by recharacterizing their products. A.H. Robins, for example, was able to avoid scrutiny by the Food and Drug
Administration by claiming that its IUD did not release copper, a property that would have
made it a "drug." Two other producers with similar products that were scrutinized by the FDA
spent years in the approval process, and therefore won approval only as the Dalkon Shield was
being removed from the market. See S. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, supra note 8, at 23. Of
course, one could view this delay as something less than a triumph of regulation, but given
Robins' fate these producers may in retrospect be happy about the way things turned out.
In addition, it should be noted that the intervention of politics into other toxic exposure
situations should leave observers ambivalent at best about the prospect of governmentally managed regulation. Thus, as the asbestos problem finally became clear through litigation, prominent legislators including Senator Gary Hart proposed bailout legislation to assist industry. See
P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 141, 194-95, 258-62. Perhaps it is reassuring, however, that this
legislation did not, we are told, have "a prayer of being enacted by Congress." Id. at 195.
Finally, where government itself is involved in the alleged misconduct, as with Agent Orange,
it seems particularly inappropriate to have regulators selected by government passing on the
conduct. Even under the existing tort system, government may be particularly able to conceal its
own wrongdoing. See Note, Citizen Trust and Government Cover-up: Refining the Doctrine of
Fraudulent Concealment, 95 YALE L.J. 1477, 1489-90 (1986) (describing government's suppression of reports of health hazards of atomic testing in Nevada and Marshall Islands). Hence, it
may be necessary to suspend the running of the statute of limitations on claims against government. See id. at 1486-99; see generally Marcus, supra note 34, at 855-901. In any event, it is
surely odd to suggest that a government which can't be trusted not to conceal harmful information from its citizens should have the power, ex ante, to absolve itself of liability for its acts.
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reason to be confident of the efficacy of proposed regulatory reforms,
we are well advised to retain tort law" (p. 288).
B.

Revised Approaches to Compensation

Alternatively, one might design a better compensation system.
Professor Schuck first suggests that the model might be workers' compensation, but quickly and properly rejects that. Whether or not one
views workers' compensation as an employers' plot to take away workers' valuable claims,40 the Agent Orange experience suggests reasons
to be skeptical about expanding the idea because, throughout the relevant period, there was such a scheme for veterans' service-related medical problems - the Veterans Administration. That example hardly
invites imitation. By 1978, the VA was the second largest federal
agency in terms of number of employees and third in budget (p. 24).
Although one VA employee spotted possible links between the herbicide and veterans' ailments, the VA reacted initially by forbidding its
employees to make file entries concerning a relation between Agent
Orange exposure and illness (p. 24). Throughout this period, the
agency resisted inquiry into the problem and upgraded its research
only when veterans' political activity reached President Carter, who
put pressure on the agency (pp. 77-78). It is hard to shrug off this
experience as an isolated failure of the VA, particularly for the Vietnam veterans. Indeed, Professor Schuck tells us that on returning
from combat many veterans embarked on "a new war - this one with
the Veterans Administration" (p. 40).
This picture becomes more troubling when one considers the recent litigation regarding attorney participation in the VA claims process. Under an 1864 statute, lawyers may not be paid more than ten
dollars to represent claimants before the VA. However reasonable that
amount may have been during the Civil War, it obviously is insufficient now to prompt a competent attorney to take a case, particularly
a difficult one. Several veterans, who claimed that they had contracted
cancer due to exposure to radiation in the service and that without the
help of a lawyer they could not gather evidence and present their complex claims effectively, challenged the limitation as a violation of due
process. Plaintiffs also claimed that VA employees randomly denied
claims in order to achieve high performance ratings, compounding the
problem created by denial of representation. Although the Supreme
Court overturned a blanket preliminary injunction against the fee limitation on the ground that most claims are not so complex as to make
denial of a lawyer a denial of due process,41 it left open the question of
whether these claimants had a right to exemption from the limitation.
40. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 16-17, 127-28.
41. Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
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Thereafter, the district court found that VA officials had destroyed evidence concerning random denials and embarked on a pattern of noncompliance with discovery requests, warranting sanctions against the
VA and appointment of a special master to enforce discovery. 42 These
developments, in tum, have rekindled legislative efforts to repeal the
ten dollar Iimitation.43
This episode does not, of course, prove that no responsive claimsprocessing alternative to the current tort system could be created. But
too often those programs must be managed by people who may not
energetically pursue claims, particularly innovative ones. This prospect should give the reformers pause, particularly in the kind of extraordinarily complex cases that concern Professor Schuck. To the
extent one introduces lawyers and judicial review into that system,
however, one may recreate the kinds of problems that cause many to
urge abandonment of the existing tort system.
Realizing many of the disadvantages of the workers' compensation
model, Professor Schuck moves on to adaptations of an idea he finds
more promising, although to date none of these adaptations has been
tried anywhere. Specifically, he refers to proposals from Professor
O'Connell and Dean Calabresi44 to create a system of incentives toward settlement to alleviate what they conceive to be defects in the
present tort system (pp. 282-86). These new ideas, which can hardly
be evaluated here in any detail, nevertheless provoke further cautions.
They betray a strong antipathy toward plaintiffs' lawyers - the very
people Professor Schuck spends most of his book describing - as
predators who take from plaintiffs and defendants to the benefit of
nobody. But the asbestos and Dalkon Shield books, tracts though
they may be, persuasively demonstrate that formal discovery and informal investigation by plaintiffs' lawyers can be crucial to relief for
plaintiffs. Professor Schuck may contrast the "incontrovertible toxicity" of asbestos with the ambiguity surrounding the question of harm
from Agent Orange, but he fails to mention that the asbestos produc42. See National Assn. of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 551-54 (N.D.
Cal. 1987). For a more general examination of charges against the VA, see Coyle, The Veterans
Administration Under Fire, Natl. L.J., June 15, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
43. See Franklin, Ruling in V.A. Suit Spurs Effort to Let Veterans Hire Lawyers, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1987, at A17, col. 2.
44. O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589 (1983);
Letter from Guido Calabresi to Blair Bolles (June 14, 1985), reprinted in G. CALABRESI & G.
PRIEST, COMMENTARY ON THE DODD AND GORTON AMENDMENTS TO S.100 (THE KASTEN
BILL) 3 (Yale Law School Program in Civil Liability Working Paper No. 34, 1985). The Calabresi paper, on which Professor Schuck seems to pin such hopes, is merely a three-page letter
from Dean Calabresi to a consultant at Colt Industries describing conversations the Dean had
with Senators Danforth, Dodd, and Gorton, seemingly in lieu of testimony on the bill. However
provocative the ideas presented, this is an exceedingly thin reed on which to pin major hopes for
change. Professor Schuck's acknowledgment that these are the "bare outlines" of a reform approach, p. 285, is not a fair disclosure of the true nature of the letter he describes.
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ers regularly controverted its danger, and apparently concealed it.
This story was pieced together by plaintiffs' lawyers over years of litigation, 45 although Schuck complains that this process took too long
(p. 289). Similarly, plaintiffs' lawyers played an important role in developing proof of the harmful effects of the Dalkon Shield,46 so it
seems simply wrong to conclude that they are mere parasites on the
system. These new proposals don't appear to offer a substitute for
them. It is true that the plaintiffs' lawyers seem to have unearthed
little about Agent Orange and Professor Schuck pays scant attention
to the material they obtained through discovery, although we are told
of at least one hot document that plaintiffs' counsel obtained (p. 85).
But the fact that they did not unearth more hot documents may show
that they lacked sufficient funds to do so, or that there are no such
documents.
Similarly ambiguous is the pervasive emphasis on cost of litigation.
In the asbestos cases, many have harped on the Rand study showing
that of the entire amount the defendants spent on litigation only
thirty-seven percent actually went to claimants. 47 Startling as that statistic seems in the abstract, it actually provides scant basis for evaluating the system absent a reliable study of costs of alternative systems.48
Moreover, the costs may be attributed in large measure to rigid defense posturing in asbestos litigation. There is some suggestion of such
behavior in Agent Orange. Thus, Professor Schuck says that the
chemical companies sought to add the United States to the litigation
"to reap strategic advantage ... [because] it would surely bog the case
down in years of discovery" (pp. 60-61). More ominously, he tells us
that when Judge Pratt vacated his stay on discovery the parties
couldn't agree at all about how it should be handled. 49 Again, the
Dalkon Shield litigation provides further confirmation. There, a judge
eventually found that defendant's stonewalling in discovery had become so pervasive that it warranted abrogation of the attorney-client
privilege under the crime or fraud exception to that privilege. 50 In
45. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 97-131.
46. Sees. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, supra note 8, at 194-227.
47. J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSfINER & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF AsBESTOS LmGATION tab. S.2, at vii (Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice, 1983).
48. Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems, 73
GEO. L.J. 1357, 1373 (1985).
49. P. 70. For a recent example of such hard-nosed lawyering by Dow Chemical Company,
a leading defendant in Agent Orange, see Grenier v. Dow Chern. Co., 624 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Me.
1986), a products liability action in which Dow sought to introduce plaintiff's thirty-four-yearold conviction for breaking and entering despite the provision of Federal Rule of Evidence
609(b). Rule 609(b) precludes admission of evidence of prior convictions that are more than ten
years old unless the probative value of the conviction regarding credibility "substantially outweighs" its prejudicial effect, surely hard to imagine with a conviction for breaking and entering.
In Grenier. Dow was represented by Leonard Rivkin, the same lawyer who represented Dow in
the Agent Orange litigation.
50. In re A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2 (D. Kan. 1985).
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short, litigation cost is a two-way street.
On balance, then, Professor Schuck's alternatives seem doubtful
substitutes for what we now have, at least in the kinds of cases he says
he is discussing. His book does not show that tort litigation has
reached an apocalyptic impasse, although the collective uncertainties
in the Agent Orange litigation itself raise important concerns about
how such cases should be handled.

III.

PROCEDURAL APOCALYPSE?

The beauty of the classical tragedy as an art form lies in the element
of catharsis - the purgation of tension that comes with the spectator's
epiphany that he too possesses the flaws that have been responsible for
the tragic hero's downfall, but that he may avoid such a fall because he
understands the moral of the drama. The moral of the asbestos drama is
that without the willingness to adopt new procedures to alleviate
problems caused by significant changes in society and the substantive
case law, those problems will persist and multiply.
- Judge Robert Parkers•

Federal district judges are increasingly willing to experiment with
procedures in challenging cases, particularly mass tort cases. Professor Schuck's book provides a detailed picture of such an experiment.
The insights are troubling, if not apocalyptic.

A. Mass Tort Class Actions
Initially, the idea for an Agent Orange class action came not from
a lawyer but as a deathbed wish of Paul Reutershan, the veteran
whose lawsuit got the Agent Orange litigation undenvay (p. 43). In
this, he expressed a seemingly widespread public view that class actions are wonderful devices for vindicating the rights of many. Adapting Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to toxic torts is a
formidable task, however, and one may legitimately question Judge
Weinstein's eventual conclusion that the class action approach would
fit better in Agent Orange than in litigation growing out of asbestos,
DES, or the Dalkon Shield (where class action treatment had been
rejected). 52 Judge Pratt had premised his initial authorization for class
action treatment more on the impossibility of individual litigation than
on the affirmative attractiveness of the class action approach (p. 68).
But there is at least some reason to suspect that, had class treatment
51. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269, 283 (E.D. Tex. 1985), ajfd., 782 F.2d 468
(5th Cir. 1986) (certifying asbestosis class action).
52. See 100 F.R.D. 718, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1983):
Unlike the asbestos, DES, Dalkon Shield, and Federal Skywa/k cases, defendants contest
liability not just as to individual members of the class, but as to any members of the class.
Thus, unlike other mass product liability cases, a determination of general causation will
serve both the interests of judicial economy and assist in the speedy and less expensive resolution of individual class member's claims.
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not been approved, individual actions would have proceeded, as they
did in the asbestos, DES, and Dalkon Shield litigation. If so, it might
have been preferable to let them run their course.
The stimulus behind Judge Weinstein's ultimate endorsement of
the class action seems to have been more a substantive preference than
a procedural determination. He hoped that the class action could be
used to ease problems of causation in toxic exposure cases where no
individual plaintiff may be able to establish that his cancer or other
harm was caused by exposure although, taken as a mass, the number
of cancers in a given population has increased due to exposure. Professor David Rosenberg has urged that the class action could, in such
situations, bridge the gap between individual causation and creation of
an "excess risk" of cancer and thereby afford some compensation. 53
As Professor Schuck argues, however, applying this theory in concrete
cases is highly problematical, and Agent Orange seems not to have
afforded a vehicle for testing it because the proof of excess risk ultimately did not materialize. 54
Putting this substantive objective aside, the book provides valid
reasons for caution in generally using class actions in mass tort cases.
One is the extent to which the lawyer controls the lawsuit without any
effective control by, or even consultation with, the "client." There is
often an unavoidable conflict of interest between class counsel, who
risk nonpayment in the event of defeat, and class members, who may
53. Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ''Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851 (1984). This general approach was proposed over 25
years ago by Professor Estep. See Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New
Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 281-98 (1960). The utility of a class-wide
approach is not limited to toxic exposure cases, however. In an employment discrimination case,
for example, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that when the impact of discriminatory practices on
individual employees is difficult to trace "a class-wide approach to the measure of back pay is
necessitated [because] ... exact reconstruction of each individual claimant's work history, as if
discrimination had not occurred, is not only imprecise but impractical." Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 261-62 (5th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
54. Thus, Judge Weinstein later reconciled the class settlement with the summary judgment
granted to defendants in the opt-out cases on the ground that studies became available after the
class action was settled which showed that there was no population-wide increase in disease
among those exposed compared with those not exposed:
The class action was settled before most of these studies were publicly available, so the
settlement was based on that information. At that time it was my assumption, and I think
the assumption of the plaintiffs certainly, that there would be certain spikes - that is, those
who were involved with Agent Orange would have had a higher degree of leukemia or soft
tissue sarcomas than the population as a whole or the non-Agent-Orange population that
went into Vietnam. On the basis of that assumption, I devised ... [the theory that] if you're
dealing with a large group you could make the defendants pay for that proportion caused by
them as a whole. . • . [Y]ou can deal with it if you have those spikes. Because if everything
is level, then you're exactly no place.
J. Weinstein, Remarks to the Section of Evidence, American Association of Law Schools (Jan. 5,
1986) (cassette 45, available at the University of Illinois Law Library); see also Tests of 444
Vietnam Veterans Find Average Dioxin Levels, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1987, at 8, col. 1 (natl. ed)
(Vietnam veterans found to have dioxin levels no higher than people who did not serve in
Vietnam).
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prefer to reject a substantial settlement in favor of the promise of a
more substantial recovery at trial. Since many of the class lawyers in
Agent Orange had made "perhaps the largest investment of their professional lives" (p. 50), there was singular pressure here. At the same
time, the gradual shift of control from Yannacone to the members of
the PMC meant that the lawyers with this stake in settlement had only
attenuated contact - and virtually no rapport - with the veterans.
Not surprisingly, many veterans believed the PMC sold them out in
accepting the settlement.
Other facts, however, show that concern about lawyers' disregard
for the interests of the class is not a compelling reason for mistrusting
the Agent Orange class action. Although Judge Weinstein viewed the
representative plaintiffs as "only names" (p. 193), it is clear that class
counsel were quite concerned about the veterans' reaction to any settlement (p. 153). More significantly, like Reutershan, many veterans
had unrealistic expectations about what could be accomplished by litigation. As Professor Schuck puts it, they viewed the case as "a searing
morality play projected onto a national stage" (p. 11). No doubt many
shared the view of the veteran who said, "I don't want this case to be
inconclusive like the war was" (p. 215). They also hoped that the litigation would be a watershed, signalling that the Vietnam veteran had
finally been accepted back into the mainstream of American life. If
the class action was a useful vehicle to obtain judicial relief, it is unfair
to carp because the case failed to achieve socio-political ends as well.
Standing alone, this aspect of the Agent Orange story is not too
unnerving.
More troubling questions arise about the legal performance of class
counsel in Agent Orange, however. Inside glimpses of the workings of
class counsel are rare, but can be striking. In re Fine Paper Antitrust
Litigation 55 graphically illustrates the problems that disagreements
among plaintiffs' lawyers can cause. There are some intimations of
competitiveness in Agent Orange as well. Thus, Yannacone & Associates were preoccupied with the threat that the Texas group would
"take over" their lawsuit (pp. 50-51, 74-76). Similarly, right up to the
minute of settlement there was substantial division among the PMC
lawyers about whether to settle or go to trial. These divisions were
compounded by the participation of the "investor" lawyers, whose
control of the purse-strings gave them more power than, and a different perspective from, the lawyers who were preparing to try the case.
Coupled with the distance between the PMC lawyers and their "clients," these aspects of the Agent Orange story provide good reason for
55. 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984). In
this price-fixing litigation, tension between the co-lead counsel for the plaintiff class was charac·
terized as "nothing more than an out-and-out power struggle that began with name calling and
ended with the establishment of separate camps (rival trial headquarters) in Philadelphia in an·
ticipation of the trial." 98 F.R.D. at 146 (footnote omitted).
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caution in certifying mass tort class actions or, at least, for promoting
efforts to reduce such structural failings in class actions that are
certified.
More basic yet is genuine concern about whether class counsel did
even a minimally adequate job of preparing for trial. The magnitude
of the Agent Orange case forced the plaintiff lawyers to organize
themselves into what has been labeled an ad hoc law firm. 56 Professor
Schuck's description hardly fills the observer with confidence about
effective partnership of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers. Whatever
the reason, it is surely troubling to learn that the chemical companies
initiated virtually all the discovery, while Yannacone & Associates
sometimes lacked sufficient resources even to buy copies of the material they had discovered (p. 92). The consortium's management consultant described it as "an accident waiting to happen" (p. 73), and
three months before the initial trial date one consortium member
warned his colleagues that they faced not only the risk of being discharged as class counsel but also a "clear danger of being the recipients of some rather nasty malpractice actions" (p. 95). Similarly
unsettling is the fact that during the hectic weekend settlement negotiations the PMC lawyers still had no accurate idea how many claims
there were (p. 161).
In theory, the court is to scrutinize class counsel carefully before
approving their appointment and to monitor the adequacy of their performance after they are approved. Indeed, the court is directed to
decertify the class even after the trial if that performance is inadequate. The Agent Orange experience leaves open the question whether
such oversight can work. We are told that "[Judge] Pratt's continuing
ignorance concerning the internecine strife within the plaintiffs' camp
was an important lever in Yannacone's struggle with his legal associates" (p. 53), because they feared if they pushed him too far he would
56. Judge Weinstein so recognized. See 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1458 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The
PMC may be considered an ad hoc law firm, a joint venture formed for the purpose of prosecuting the Agent Orange multidistrict litigation."). For analysis of the theory underlying such arrangements, see Coffee, supra note 18, at 57-69; Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney:
The Implications ofEconomic Theory for Private Enforcement ofLaw Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669, 704-12 (1986). Although the Second Circuit eventually
rejected the idea that the arrangement among plaintiffs' counsel in the Agent Orange litigation
constituted an ad hoc law firm, see note 27 supra, it should be noted that the idea has some
currency in practice. Thus, a recent article on litigator Stephen Susman of Texas reported that
he relied in part on "a blossoming expertise in a rare organizational specialty - management of
'ad hoc' law firms for effective pursuit of complex cases." Taylor, No Apologies Made for the
Profit Motive, Natl. L.J., Mar. 30, 1987, at l, col. 1, 27, col. 2.
Financing was not the only way in which the Agent Orange arrangement differed from the
more traditional law firms representing defendants. "Led by the colorful, headline-grabbing
Yannacone, they waged their war against Agent Orange outside the courtroom as well as within
it," while defense counsel shunned the media. P. 72. Furthermore, as one of the plaintiffs' lawyers noted, "[t]heir paper work was superb; we sometimes filed our briefs without staples, cutting
and pasting on our way to the courthouse. The Wall Street boys would file errata sheets correcting an incorrect page cite; we made so many errors we didn't bother." P. 73.
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"blow the whistle" to the judge. But without such defections, as in
Fine Paper, 57 it is difficult to understand how the judge is to perform
his oversight duties. Given the structural difficulties presented by trying to mold a group of personal injury lawyers into a mock-up of a law
firm, these concerns are particularly acute in massive personal injury
litigation like Agent Orange.
It may be that coordinated but independent efforts by plaintiffs'
lawyers handling individual cases actually provide better assurance of
thorough preparation. Information sharing among plaintiffs' lawyers
has become a widespread feature of the contemporary litigation landscape. 58 Both the asbestos and Dalkon Shield experiences~show that it
can work. Although the first asbestos and Dalkon Shield suits were
not successful, plaintiffs' counsel doggedly continued to pursue discovery and investigation, pooling the fruit of early litigation in a combined effort to vanquish the defendant. There is some empirical
evidence to support the proposition that contingency-fee lawyers will
invest more effort than hourly-fee lawyers Oike class counsel, who are
usually paid on a hourly basis via court-awarded fees). 59 Hence, these
experiences with other mass torts may provide further reason for
shunning the class action model in such actions, but it would be a
mistake to make too much of the comparison. The challenges confronting plaintiffs' counsel in Agent Orange may have been of such a
different order that the case is not analogous. Moreover, Yannacone's
initial consortium was replaced by the PMC, which seems to have
done a better job. The Agent Orange story actually shows that other
forces, mainly financial, may cause underprepared class counsel to enlist support even though the judge cannot effectively evaluate their
pre-trial performance. Nonetheless, Professor Schuck's book raises
very serious questions about efforts to mold the class action device to
fit mass torts, particularly mass exposure cases. 60
57. In In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), ajfd. in part, revd. in
part, 151F.2d562 (3d Cir. 1984), plaintiffs' lead counsel Harold Kohn broke ranks and attacked
the handling of the case by his co-lead counsel, Granville Specks. See Bruck, Harold Kohn
Against the World, AM. LAW., Jan. 1982, at 28.
58. See Kirsch, Evidence Sharing, CAL. LAW., June 1985, at 19. This sort of sharing has
been going on for over twenty years. See Rheingold, The MER/29 Story - An Instance of
Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 122 (1968) (describing meeting of
plaintiffs' lawyers at ATLA meeting in 1963 to discuss coordinated strategy in litigation relating
to anti-cholesterol drug MER/29). In both the asbestos and Dalkon Shield litigations, such
sharing was common, although it was sometimes impeded by court-imposed confidentiality orders. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 8, at 92; see generally Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective
Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 41-46 (1983) (discussing modification of confidentiality
orders to allow use of evidence in other litigation).
59. See Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & Trubek, The Impact ofFee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort,
19 L. & SocY. REV. 251, 267 (1985).
60. This is certainly the reaction of the Second Circuit, which concluded that "[t]he present
litigation justifies the prevalent skepticism over the usefulness of class actions in so-called mass
tort cases and, in particular, claims for injuries resulting from toxic exposure." 818 F.2d 145,
164 (2d Cir. 1987).
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Lest the picture seem too gloomy, however, it is important to mention seemingly contrary experiences. For example, in March and
April 1985, an outbreak of salmonella in six midwestem states, resulting in what a committee of the Illinois Legislature called the largest
mass food poisoning in United States history, 61 was traced to tainted
milk. Nearly 17,000 culture confirmations were eventually identified.
Needless to say, litigation resulted. In a series of innovative moves, a
class action for compensatory and punitive damages was certified by
the Illinois state courts; 62 all cases pending in the Illinois state court
system were consolidated for pre-trial discovery before one circuit
court, 63 and a federal court entertaining a parallel class action stayed
its proceedings in deference to the state court litigation. 64 After substantial discovery, the case went to trial in November 1986, a yearand-a-half after the incidents. Defendant Jewel Companies then stipulated to liability for compensatory damages to the certified classes. 65
The case was tried for ten weeks on punitive damages, and the jury
eventually found there was no justification for a punitive award. 66
Since then, the parties have reached a preliminary agreement about a
claims procedure for compensatory claims. 67 Certainly this example
shows promise for the future.

B. Managerial Judging
Spurred by the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, federal judges have become increasingly assertive in controlling litigation before them. These developments have, in tum,
sparked a firestorm of debate about the proper functioning of judges
that rivals the current preoccupation with the tort system. But the
61. ILLINOIS HOUSE STATE GOVT. ADMIN. AND REGULATORY REVIEW COMM., REPORT
ON THE 1985 ILLINOIS SALMONELLA EPIDEMIC 1(June26, 1985).
62. In re Salmonella Litig., No. 85 L 000000 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 1985) (memorandum
opinion and order certifying class action).
63. In re Salmonella Litig., No. 61974 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 27, 1985) (order granting consolidation for pre-trial discovery); In re Salmonella Litig., No. 63629 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 30, 1986)
(order directing consolidated discovery); In re Salmonella Litig., No. 61974 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Sept.
22, 1986) (order directing consolidated discovery).
64. See Schomber v. Jewel Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
65. In re Salmonella Litig., No. 85 L 000000 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 1986) (stipulation regarding compensatory liability).
66. See Jury Rules Stores Not Negligent in Poisoning, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1987, at 8, col. 3
(natl. ed.).
67. Counsel for the plaintiff class and defendant Jewel negotiated an agreement, preliminarily
approved by the court, to establish a Salmonella Personal Injury Claims Facility. The court
directed that notice of the proposed settlement and a claim form be sent by mail to all persons
known by counsel to be in the class, and that notice also be published in a number of newspapers
and announced on television and radio. In re Salmonella Litig., No. 85 L 000000 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 30, 1987) (order preliminarily approving claims facility and class notification procedures).
The claims facility, to be administered by a retired circuit judge, was expected to resolve in excess
of 20,000 claims for personal injury and medical expenses. Chief Judge Harry G. Comerford,
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Press Release (Apr. 30, 1987).
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debate has often been carried on at a rather abstract level. 68 The
Agent Orange story provides an opportunity to examine these issues in
a concrete setting. The results are discomfiting.
The starting point is the administration of Judge Pratt, who presided over the case from 1979 to October 1983. Professor Schuck depicts him as "a fairly conservative, conventional, workmanlike judge"
(p. 111). He relays the views of the lawyers that the judge was "simply
paralyzed by the magnitude and complexity of the case" (p. 80), and
therefore ran the case like an "absentee landlord" (p. 117). As a result
the case meandered, a situation that all seem to have deplored:
"[W]e'd still be in discovery if Weinstein had not taken the case over"
(p. 198). Here, at least, it appears that the traditional judicial action
didn't work. 69
As Professor Schuck describes him, Judge Weinstein could hardly
have been more different, and the enduring question is whether his
remarkable handling of the case should be preferred to Judge Pratt's
more conventional attitude. Indeed, there is something of a love/hate
dichotomy in Schuck's attitude toward Weinstein. One image of
Weinstein is of the "judicial wizard" (p. 128) with a "towering reputation" (p. 111), "vast imagination ... and almost blinding brilliance"
(p. 112). Thus, the judge's initial meeting with the lawyers when he
took the case over is twice described as "dazzling" (pp. 112, 117), and
we are regaled about the "true artistry" and "sublime skill" (p. 132)
with which Weinstein applied his "fertile, analytically powerful mind"
(p. 186) to the problems of the case. But Professor Schuck sees a
darker side to these talents. We are also informed that the "wily
judge" (p. 137) could "work both sides of the street" (p. 131), that he
combined "prestidigitation" with "rank insubordination" (p. 130) in
68. Thus the leading critical article, Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376
(1982), has been criticized as relying on two imaginary lawsuits rather than real life cases. See
Flanders, Blind Umpires -A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 508 (1984),
Gradually, we are getting information about concrete cases. See McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 441-42 (1986) ("With
a sufficient database of case histories, it may be possible by reasoning inductively to develop a
functional approach for the judicial management of complex cases."). At present, however, one
must also agree with Professor Schuck's assessment that "one who would study this issue has
little choice of data; the Agent Orange case is perhaps the only complex litigation whose settlement has been the subject of a detailed academic case study. Until more is known about other
such cases, Agent Orange's typicality must remain an open question." Schuck, The Role of the
Judge in Settling Complex Cases: TheAgent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 340 n.15
(1986).
69. Lest it appear that Judge Pratt took a hidebound approach to the case, it must be empha·
sized that he did not. To the contrary, Professor Schuck acknowledges that he handled several
problems innovatively. See, e.g., p. 93 (Pratt resolved the problem of governmental privilege "in
an innovative fashion"). More significantly, Schuck recognizes that Judge Pratt's class certification opinion "undermines the notion, widely shared by the Agent Orange lawyers, that Pratt
viewed the case as a conventional tort dispute." P. 68. In all of that, Pratt was in the mainstream of the evolving judicial management movement. The point here is that, compared to
Judge Weinstein, he did take a cautious and traditional approach.
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his handling of legal issues, and that he manipulated the law in ways
that would keep the parties off balance. He even, we are told, employed Socratic probing of a government lawyer to bully her into what
he later treated as a concession critical to denying the government
Feres protection against claims of civilian plaintiffs although the government "had conceded no such thing" (p. 134).
We need not try to reconcile these disparate images of Judge Weinstein. There is no doubt that he is rightly regarded as one of the most
capable, if not the most outstanding, district judge in the nation.70 So
great are his powers that "[w]hen Weinstein was on the bench, the
lawyers often seemed superfluous. Instead of being the target of the
lawyer's wiles and manipulations, as most judges were, he was more
often the master of those tactics, confounding lawyers and, when necessary, making up the rules as he went along" (p. 112). The question
is whether, particularly in the hands of such a talented judge, the new
managerial trend gives too much power to one official. As a lesson in
the apocalypse of the litigation system, Agent Orange has some disquieting aspects.
Certainly the judge did a masterful job of seizing the initiative and
promoting settlement. He effectively deployed his special masters as a
settlement squad. They, in turn, took the ball and ran with it. Indeed,
the around-the-clock weekend of negotiations that led to settlement
was the brainchild of one of the masters, not the judge, and he ordered
the lawyers to report to the courthouse before he cleared the idea with
the judge (p. 150). During the hectic weekend, the initiative belonged
entirely to the judge and his minions; when the plaintiffs' lawyers
made an eleventh-hour attempt to discuss a separate settlement with
some of the defendants, they were rebuffed by defendants, who insisted
that all negotiations go through the court (p. 164). Moreover, the
judge very effectively pressured the PMC members at the critical moment. Some of the plaintiffs' lawyers claimed that they understood
him to say he would grant a directed verdict to defendants and hold
the PMC lawyers personally responsible for rejecting the $180 million
settlement, prospects that left at least one lawyer shaken (pp. 160-63).
It may be fair to say, as Professor Schuck does, that the judge "played
a massive game of chicken" (p. 259) and it is clear that he "sired" the
settlement (p. 166). In terms of process values, these tactics, taken in
the aggregate, raise serious questions about the propriety of judicial
activism in promoting settlement. In sum, "Weinstein had fused in
himself legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, subject to no
70. Thus, in affirming Judge Weinstein's handling of the class action, the Second Circuit paid
heed to his "creative approach," which the court found "bold and imaginative," and also referred
to "the intellectual power of Chief Judge Weinstein's analysis." 818 F.2d 145, 165-67 (2d Cir.
1987).
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checks and balances and no higher authority than his own conscience
and the unlikely intervention of the appellate court" (p. 223).
Although Professor Schuck exposes these process issues, he does
not pursue the most intriguing line: Far from acting as a mere
facilitator of settlement negotiations, the judge imposed his own preferred settlement on the parties. This fact became graphically clear as
evening was falling on the Sunday before trial was to begin. By that
time, the PMC had dropped its demand to $200 million. While meeting with defense counsel, Special Master Shapiro, who was acting as
point man in the shuttle diplomacy, concluded that "the defendants,
facing the specter of trial the very next day, could easily be convinced
that $200 million would be a cheap settlement" (p. 158). As a negotiator, then, he felt he had settlement in his grasp, but he soon found that
"[t]he real obstacle to a $200 million settlement ... was ... Judge
Weinstein. Shapiro had tried to convince Weinstein that the defendants could be pushed up to $200 million, but the judge adamantly
refused. . . . All things considered, he insisted, $180 million plus interest was the fair amount" (p. 159). Thus, when defense counsel proposed increasing their offer, Shapiro surprised them by telling them
not to move because, if they did, the PMC would never come down
below $200 million (p. 160). Tactically, of course, he was right; given
the judge's goal of $180 million, this was a necessary position. The
intriguing problem is to evaluate the judge's selection of this settlement figure. Was it right or wrong?
Professor Schuck tells us that he does not know where the $180
million figure came from, but the judge "almost certainly had it firmly
in mind well before the weekend negotiations began" (p. 159). He
may, indeed, have discussed it with one of the special masters over a
month before. Since Schuck apparently never talked to the judge, 71
we do not have the judge's reasoning for selecting this particular figure. We are told, however, that when Special Master Shapiro tried to
persuade him to press for a $200 million settlement, the judge explained that because the veterans' case was shaky he had an obligation
to the legal system not to encourage groundless mass toxic tort litigation in the future by allowing a settlement that would signal that the
case was stronger than it was. During the negotiations, neither side
knew of the judge's private agenda, and when Shapiro later revealed it
to Dow's lawyer he responded that "[t]he man's too much of an idealist" (p. 159). Shortly after the settlement was announced, the defendants were quoted as believing the settlement was a bargain, even" '10
cents on the dollar.' " 72 Particularly given defendants' willingness to
71. His list of interviewees includes Judge Pratt but not Judge Weinstein. See pp. 301·02.
We are told that one person agreed to be interviewed on condition the entire interview be kept
confidential, p. 301, but there is no reason to believe this person was Judge Weinstein.
72. Press, supra note 6, at 56.
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pay more, the central enigma of the book is assessing the judge's settlement figure.
Is this judging? It is far from the classical view of the judge as
inactive figure who decides according to announced rules of law. Yet
that vision has long since given way to a more flexible view of the
judicial function; promoting settlement is now an accepted part of the
picture. It is surely troubling to picture judges as unprincipled settlement promoters who only care about achieving settlement, and not
about the terms, particularly when they are armed with the variety of
persuasive tools Judge Weinstein employed in the Agent Orange litigation. Better, perhaps, that they should be idealists whose settlement
posture is informed by a vision of what is right. Indeed, that may
make them superior in the settlement arena as well.
The Agent Orange case illustrates this point. A primary impediment to settlement, from the defendants' perspective, was allocation of
any global settlement figure among defendants. Despite long efforts to
resolve the problem among themselves, the defendants failed. The
defendants' solution? "Let's let the judge do it; he's fair" (p. 156).
And so he devised a formula that "brought squeals of pain and shrieks
of delight from the lawyers" (p. 156), but which even the unhappy
accepted. Similarly, when the ability of one of the small defendants to
pay threatened to derail the settlement later, the judge was again recruited to decide the issue (p. 164). In each instance, "the settlement
hinged on the lawyers' perception that Weinstein was scrupulously fair
and their willingness to be guided by his decision when internal negotiations reached an impasse" (p. 164). An unscrupulous pursuer of a
deal, any deal, would probably not be able to perform this function.
But is this judging? What standards did Judge Weinstein use in
fashioning the critical allocation formula? Were they "legal"?7 3 In a
sense, these episodes suggest a model of judging that depends more on
the personality of the judge than on his position in the institutional
hierarchy. Judge Weinstein could do it but Judge Pratt, perhaps,
could not. It is nice to have charismatic judges, but this is hardly a
trend to be embraced; as Max Weber observed long ago, in a complex
society it is necessary to shift authority from a charismatic to an institutionalized leadership. 74 Of all governmental officials, this should be
73. As Professor Subrin has recently put it, "[a] goal of mediation and conciliation, and
perhaps to a lesser extent case management, is to avoid judicial application of the law, or at least
formal application of the law." Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 988 (1987). He laments that "[t]o the extent that advocates of case management, settlement, or alternative dispute
resolution give up on law application, they are giving up on the essence of adjudication. Ironically, their attempt to remedy the flaws in judicial dispute resolution rejects the major function
that courts perform." Id. at 989.
74. See generally M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND EcONOMIC ORGANIZATION
329-60 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954) (describing shift of authority from "charismatic" to bureaucratic or traditional figures). Much as primitive man may need a charismatic leader to impose
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most true of judges, and our system therefore resolutely opposes judge
shopping while permitting forum shopping. 75 Although Agent Orange thus affords an intriguing glimpse into the "brave new world" of
judging, the judge's resolution of defendants' internal disputes is institutionally troubling.
The judge's settlement figure, however, is more problematical. At
least the defense lawyers submitted their internal disputes to the judge
for his disposition with their eyes open. The PMC did not, so far as
we are told. To the contrary, after he failed to persuade the judge to
press for a $200 million settlement, Special Master Shapiro told the
PMC that "they would never get the defendants to go above $180 million" (p. 159; emphasis added) even though he had by then concluded
that the defendants could easily be convinced to pay more. No doubt
the PMC lawyers, unlike Dow's lawyer, did not call the judge an "idealist" when they found out what really happened.
Unfortunately, Professor Schuck does not give us tools to evaluate
the judge's settlement figure. 76 Certainly one must sympathize with
the judge's desire not to promote groundless litigation. But if he believed these plaintiffs' suit groundless, should he have put his energies
into promoting a settlement? Surely judges ought not foster efforts by
plaintiffs to pump up the settlement value of their cases by trading on
the transaction costs of litigation77 - the "orangemail" criticized by
the New York Times. The PMC's preparation problems, indeed, may
have strongly suggested to the judge that he would have to direct a
verdict against plaintiffs. That is what some of the PMC lawyers
claimed they understood him to be saying when he urged them to accept $180 million. But the PMC's pre-trial projections suggested that
if they won, the jury would award over $1 billion, so while the
probability of success was low the potential dimension of success was
high. This was seemingly important to defendants as well, for $180
million is more than a nuisance amount. By the time the settlement
was reached on the eve of the trial, defendants' additional legal costs
social order by personal force, the endurance of social order requires that more ordinary people
be vested with social power. There are not enough judges of Weinstein's caliber to go around; we
have to rely on judges like Pratt. Indeed, given Professor Schuck's claims that Judge Weinstein
misused his extraordinary intellectual powers, one may legitimately prefer more ordinary judges.
75. See Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System,
93 YALE L.J. 677, 696-98, 706-07 n.183 (1984) (describing plaintiff's broad "venue privilege"
and the rule against judge shopping).
76. In an article addressing the economic analysis of settlements as illuminated by the Agent
Orange litigation, Professor Schuck did note reasons why judges are poorly situated in general to
predict litigation outcomes accurately. See Schuck, supra note 68, at 349-51 (1986). But at the
same time he expressly declined to address the question "whether ..• settlement of a dispute can
be said to be more or less ~ust' or desirable than the alternative of litigating to judgment." Id. at
341 n.16.
77. Cf Marcus, The Revival ofFact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 454-58 (1986) (discussing utility of pleadings decisions to reduce risk of
nuisance settlements).
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must have been much less. Thus, there are myriad variables at work,
and even a complete explanation of the process by which the judge
reached his figure, though extremely interesting, might well not dispel
the uneasiness it creates.
This uneasiness is compounded by the judge's necessary role under
class action procedure in deciding whether the settlement is fair and
therefore should be approved. 78 This process resulted in highly dramatic encounters between Judge Weinstein and veterans opposed to
the settlement. The judge was not, of course, required to disapprove
merely because of widespread opposition,79 but he should have had an
open mind. Whatever these sessions accomplished by way of catharsis
for the veterans, however, it is hard to believe they had any impact on
the judge's ultimate decision to approve the settlement he had sired.
Having prevented his own special masters from making a deal at $200
million, he could hardly be expected to change his views because some
veterans said $180 million was not enough. As Professor Schuck
points out, a fairness evaluation by the judge who acted as midwife to
the settlement seems inherently flawed (pp. 178-79).
The judge's role in the settlement therefore presents the central
conundrum in the case. The uncertainty of the law regarding toxic
torts and the fact this was a class action both contributed to the
judge's influence on the settlement. Beyond doubt, Judge Weinstein
was striving throughout to do justice, and all seem to concede the litigation would never have gotten moving but for his efforts. Clearly he
did achieve rough justice by assuring that some sort of judicial relief
would flow to some veterans. But the judicial system and procedural
theory will have to contend for the foreseeable future with the question whether rough justice of this sort is an acceptable substitute for
in-court adjudication according to announced rules. On this central
issue, Professor Schuck has left us with a starting point but few directions. In a book of this sort, that may be all he could do.
78. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), a class action may be settled only with
approval of the court.
79. See TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1982)
(footnote omitted):
Especially when a dispute centers on the sufficiency of a settlement fund .•. , majority
opposition to a settlement tends to indicate that the settlement may not be adequate since
class members presumably know what is in their own best interests. Nevertheless, majority
opposition to a settlement cannot serve as an automatic bar to a settlement that a district
judge, after weighing all the strengths and weaknesses of a case and the risks of litigation,
determines to be manifestly reasonable. Preventing settlement in such circumstances not
only deprives other class members of the benefits of a manifestly fair settlement and subjects
them to the uncertainties of litigation, but, in this case, would most likely have resulted in
the eventual disappointment of the objecting class members as well.
In the Agent Orange litigation, of course, there was no way to ascertain majority sentiment given
the enormous size of the class.
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CONCLUSION

Agent Orange, well ... that's a case which is so extreme in so many
respects as not to be useful for most of the problems that we have to deal
with.
- Chief Judge Jack Weinstein80

Perhaps, on balance, it would be better not to generalize from the
Agent Orange litigation experience, as it may be dangerous to generalize from the Vietnam experience. But Professor Schuck clearly hoped
to go beyond chronicling the Agent Orange story and, drawing upon
it, to convey an apocalyptic message. The message he chose to emphasize, however, seems to be the wrong one. Treated as a parable for the
failure of the tort system, the Agent Orange story is a poor fit because
it is such a special case. Even as a harbinger of mass exposure litigation it is of doubtful value; the recent books on asbestos and Dalkon
Shield litigation suggest that the tort system serves a purpose in such
cases.
The truly apocalyptic implications relate to active judicial promotion of settlement. In this, Agent Orange is a special case because of
the extraordinary legal difficulties presented by toxic tort litigation.
But the special features of the case do not prevent it from being a
harbinger of things to come in judicial management of litigation. The
array of settlement-inducing devices deployed by Judge Weinstein in
Agent Orange can also be utilized in ordinary cases, and recent experience suggests that these techniques will not be limited to extraordinary
cases. 81 Moreover, the enthusiasm for nonlitigated resolution of disputes, which sometimes reaches religious fervor, 82 can encourage
judges to prefer not-so-gentle persuasion to other means of resolving
cases. As an extreme version of this judicial activity, Agent Orange
does graphically depict the problem oflegitimacy that should be a central issue on the agenda of the next decade. Determining whether this
vision is truly apocalyptic must await further developments.

80. J. Weinstein, Remarks, supra note 54.
81. See R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LmGATION 13 (1985) ("[I]t is obvious that
complex litigation was the nose by which the camel of judicial control got into the litigation tent,
and that complex litigation is providing a model for the handling of all litigation.").
82. Cf. Ohio Civil ~ghts Commn. v. Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986), in
which a teacher was fired for disregarding the "biblical chain of command" for resolving dis·
putes. "The core of this doctrine, rooted in passages from the New Testament, is that one Christian should not take another Christian into courts of the State." 106 S. Ct. at 2721.

